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Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) in its current design requires a violation
of a Bell’s inequality between two parties, Alice and Bob, who are connected by a quantum channel.
However, in reality, quantum channels are lossy and current DIQKD protocols are thus vulnerable
to attacks exploiting the detection-loophole of the Bell test. Here, we propose a novel approach to
DIQKD that overcomes this limitation. In particular, we propose a protocol where the Bell test is
performed entirely on two casually independent devices situated in Alice’s laboratory. As a result,
the detection-loophole caused by the losses in the channel is avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]
relies on the fact that two honest parties, Alice and Bob,
can devise tests—utilizing laws of quantum physics—to
detect any attack by an eavesdropper, Eve, that would
compromise the secrecy of the key strings they gener-
ate [3]. While the theoretical principles allowing this
are nowadays well understood, it turns out that real-
izing QKD with practical devices is rather challenging.
That is, the devices must conform to very specific mod-
els, otherwise the implementation may contain loopholes
allowing side-channel attacks [4].
In general, there are two broad approaches towards
overcoming such implementation flaws. The first is to
include all possible imperfections into the model used in
the security analysis. This approach, however, is quite
cumbersome and it is unclear whether any specific model
includes all practically relevant imperfections. In the
second approach, which is known as device-independent
QKD (DIQKD) [5–9], the security is based solely on the
observation of non-local statistical correlations, thus it is
no longer necessary to provide any model for the devices
(though a few assumptions are still required). In this
respect, DIQKD appears to be the ultimate solution to
guarantee security against inadvertently flawed devices
and side-channel attacks.
DIQKD in its current design requires the two distant
parties Alice and Bob to perform a Bell test [10] (typi-
cally the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) test [11]),
which is applied to pairs of entangled quantum systems
shared between them. In practice, these quantum sys-
tems are typically realized by photons, which are dis-
tributed via an optical fiber. Hence, due to losses dur-
ing the transmission, the individual measurements car-
ried out on Alice’s and Bob’s sites only succeed with
bounded (and often small) probability. In standard Bell
experiments, one normally accounts for these losses by
introducing the fair-sampling assumption, which asserts
that the set of runs of the experiment—in which both
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements succeeded—is represen-
tative for the set of all runs.
In the context of DIQKD, however, the fair-sampling
assumption is not justified since Eve may have control
over the set of detected events. More concretely, she may
use her control to emulate quantum correlations based
on a local deterministic model, i.e., she instructs the de-
tector to click only if the measurement setting (chosen
by the party, e.g., Alice) is compatible with the pre-
arranged values. This problem is commonly known as
the detection-loophole [12]. In fact, for state-of-the-art
DIQKD protocols, it has been shown in Ref. [13] that the
detection-loophole is already unavoidable when using op-
tical fibers of about 5km length.
One possible solution to this problem are heralded
qubit amplifiers [14], which have been proposed recently.
The basic idea is to herald the arrival of an incoming
quantum system without destroying the quantum infor-
mation it carries. This allows Alice and Bob to choose
their measurement settings only after receiving the con-
firmation, which is crucial for guaranteeing security. Un-
fortunately, realizing an efficient heralded qubit amplifier
that is applicable for long distance DIQKD is extremely
challenging; although there has been progress along this
direction [15].
In this work, we take a different approach to circum-
vent the detection-loophole. We propose a protocol that
combines a self-testing scheme for the Bennett and Bras-
sard (BB84) states [1] with a protocol topology inspired
by the “time-reversed” BB84 protocol [16–19]. Crucially,
the protocol only requires Bell tests carried out locally in
Alice’s laboratory, so that the detection probabilities are
not affected by the losses in the channel connecting Alice
and Bob. We show that the protocol provides device-
independent security under the assumption that certain
devices are causally independent (see below for a more
precise specification of the assumptions).
In contrast to existing protocols for DIQKD, whose
security is inferred from the monogamy of non-local cor-
relations, the security of our protocol is proved using a
recent generalization of the entropic uncertainty relation
that accounts for quantum side information [20]. This is
the key ingredient that allows us to circumvent the need
to bound the non-locality between particle pairs shared
by Alice and Bob (non-locality over larger distances is
hard to achieve, as explained above). Instead, the uncer-
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2tainty relation solely depends on the local properties of
the states sent by Alice, which in turn, can be inferred
from the local Bell test.
Technically, our security proof uses a relation between
the local CHSH test and a variant of the entropic un-
certainty relation for smooth entropies [21]. The analy-
sis applies to the (practically relevant) finite-size regime,
where the secret key is generated after a finite number
of channel uses. The resulting bounds on the achievable
key size are comparable to the almost tight finite-size
result [22] for the BB84 protocol. Furthermore, in the
(commonly studied) asymptotic limit where the number
of channel uses tends to infinity, and in the limiting case
where the CHSH inequality is maximally violated, the
performance of our protocol reaches the one of the BB84
protocol.
II. REQUIRED ASSUMPTIONS
As mentioned above, our goal is to impose only limited
and realistic assumptions on the devices used by Alice
and Bob. These are as follows:
First, it is assumed that Alice and Bob’s laboratories
are perfectly isolated, i.e., no information leaves a party’s
laboratory unless this is foreseen by the protocol. Sec-
ond, we assume that Alice and Bob can locally carry
out classical computations using trusted devices and that
they have trusted sources of randomness. Third, we as-
sume that Alice and Bob share an authenticated classical
channel. Finally, we require that the devices of Alice and
Bob are causally independent, that is, there is no cor-
relation in their behavior between different uses. This,
for instance, is guaranteed if the devices have no internal
memory or if their memory can be reliably erased after
each use.
We remark that, in very recent work [23–25], it has
been shown that this last assumption can be weakened
further for standard DIQKD protocols. More precisely,
it is shown that the assumption of causal independence
can be dropped for the repeated uses of a device within
one execution of the protocol. However, the assumption
of causal independence still needs to be made when the
same devices are reused in a subsequent execution of the
protocol, as information about previously generated keys
may leak otherwise [26].
III. PROTOCOL TOPOLOGY
In this section we describe the basic idea and the main
structure of the QKD scheme we propose. The actual
protocol will then be detailed in the next section.
Our proposal is motivated by the time-reversed BB84
protocol [16–19]. This protocol involves a third party,
Charlie, whose task is to help Alice and Bob distribute
their key strings. Importantly, however, no trust in this
third party is required. While a deviation of Charlie from
S S0Mkey Mtest M0key
{Z,X} {Z,X}{U,V,P}
Alice Bob
Charlie
{0, 1}2{0, 1} {0, 1} {0, 1}
FIG. 1. Topology. The protocol is inspired by the idea of
the time-reversed BB84 protocol and involves an additional
(untrusted) party, Charlie. Charlie is supposed to make an
entangling measurement (ideally, a Bell-state-measurement)
on quantum states sent by Alice and Bob. He outputs either
a pass or fail to indicate whether the measurement was suc-
cessful. If successful, he additionally outputs two bits to be
used by Alice to make correcting bit-flip operations.
the protocol may cause abortion of the key distribution
protocol, it will not compromise the secrecy of a success-
fully distributed key string. The time-reversed BB84 pro-
tocol consists of the followings steps: first, Alice and Bob
each generate a pair of qubits in the maximally entan-
gled state |Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)√2 and send one of their
qubits to Charlie. Subsequently, Charlie performs a Bell-
state-measurement (BSM) on the two received qubits and
broadcasts the outcome to Alice and Bob [27]. The two
remaining qubits held by Alice and Bob are now in a Bell
state. Alice then applies appropriate bit and phase flips
on her qubit to convert this joint state to |Φ+〉. Finally,
Alice and Bob measure their qubits at random in one of
the two BB84 bases. Note that Alice and Bob can al-
ternatively measure the qubits they kept before Charlie
performs the BSM, and Alice flips the outcome of her
measurement if necessary once she has received the cor-
rection (i.e., the outcome of the BSM) from Charlie.
The security of the time-reversed BB84 protocol, as
described above, depends on the correct preparation and
measurement of the states by Alice and Bob. In order
to turn this protocol into a device independent one, we
add a CHSH test on Alice’s site. Security is then es-
tablished by virtue of a relation between the violation of
this CHSH test and the incompatibility of the two pos-
sible measurements carried out by Alice’s device (which
are supposed to be in the two BB84 bases). More pre-
cisely, we bound the overlap between the basis vectors
of the two measurements that Alice may choose. This is
all that is needed to apply the entropic uncertainty re-
lation [21] mentioned in the introduction, which allows
us to infer security without any further assumptions on
Alice’s and Bob’s devices. We note that our modification
of the time-reversed BB84 protocol is reminiscent of the
idea of self-testing of devices introduced by Mayers and
Yao [28] (see Ref. [29] for the CHSH version). Our test
has however a different purpose: its goal is to certify the
incompatibility of Alice’s local measurements, while the
test of Mayers and Yao certifies that Alice and Bob share
a maximally entangled state.
In order to realize the CHSH test, we use a setup with
three different devices on Alice’s site: two measurement
3devices Mkey, Mtest and a source device S (see Fig. 1).
The source device generates a pair of entangled qubits
and sends them to Mkey and Mtest. The device Mkey has
two settings {X,Z} [30] and produces a binary output
after one of the settings is chosen by Alice. The device
Mtest has three settings {U,V,P}. The first two produce
a binary output (a measurement outcome), and the last
one sends the qubit (from the device S) to the quantum
channel which connects to Charlie. Alice has therefore
two modes of operation, of which one (corresponding to
the settings U,V) is used to carry out the CHSH test
and one (corresponding to the setting P) is chosen to
communicate to Charlie. We refer to these operation
modes as ΓCHSH and ΓQKD, respectively.
Bob has two devices: a measurement device M′key and
a source device S′. The latter generates entangled qubits
and sends one of them to the quantum channel and the
other to M′key. The device M′key has two settings {X,Z}
and produces a binary output after one of the settings is
chosen by Bob.
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The protocol is parameterized by the secret key length
`, the classical post-processing block size mx, the error
rate estimation sample size mz, the local CHSH test sam-
ple size mj , the tolerated CHSH value Stol, the tolerated
channel error rate Qtol, the tolerated efficiency of Char-
lie’s operation ηtol, the error correction leakage leakEC
and the required correctness εcor.
In the following, the first three steps are repeated
until the conditions in the sifting step are satisfied.
1. State preparation and distribution: Alice selects an
operation mode hi ∈ {ΓCHSH,ΓQKD} where ΓCHSH is
selected with probability ps = ηtolmj/
(
ηtolmj + (
√
mx +√
mz)
2
)
and ΓQKD is selected with probability 1−ps [31].
In the following, we describe ΓCHSH and ΓQKD formally
for each of the runs, which we label with indices i.
ΓCHSH: Alice measures both halves of the bipartite
state. More specifically, she chooses two bit values ui, vi
uniformly at random, where ui sets the measurement on
the first half to X or Z and vi sets the measurement on the
second half to U or V. The outputs of each measurement
are recorded in si and ti, respectively.
ΓQKD: Alice selects a measurement setting ai ∈ {X,Z}
with probabilities px = 1/(1 +
√
(mz/mx)) and 1 − px,
respectively [31], measures one half of the bipartite state
with it and stores the measurement output in yi. The
other half of the bipartite state is sent to Charlie.
Similarly, Bob selects a measurement setting
bi ∈ {X,Z} with probabilities px and 1 − px, re-
spectively, measures one half of the bipartite state with
it and stores the measurement output in y′i. The other
half of the bipartite state is sent to Charlie.
2. Charlie’s operation: Charlie makes an entangling
measurement on the quantum states sent by Alice and
Bob, and if it is successful, he broadcasts fi = pass,
otherwise he broadcasts fi = fail. Furthermore, if
fi = pass, then Charlie communicates gi ∈ {0, 1}2 to
Alice and Bob. Finally, Alice uses gi to make correcting
bit flip operations.
3. Sifting: Alice and Bob announce their choices
{hi}i, {ai}i, {bi}i over an authenticated classical chan-
nel and identify the following sets: key generation X :=
{i : (hi = ΓQKD) ∧ (ai = bi = X) ∧ (fi = pass)}, chan-
nel error rate estimation Z := {i : (hi = ΓQKD) ∧ (ai =
bi = Z) ∧ (fi = pass)}, and Alice’s local CHSH test set,
J := {i : hi = ΓCHSH}.
The protocol repeats steps (1)-(3) as long as |X | < mx
or |Z| < mz or |J | < mj , where mx,mz,mj ∈ N. We
refer to these as the sifting condition.
4. Parameter estimation: To compute the CHSH value
from J , Alice uses the following formula, Stest := 8∑
i∈J f(ui, vi, si, ti)/|J | − 4, where f(ui, vi, si, ti) = 1
if si ⊕ ti = ui ∧ vi, otherwise f(ui, vi, si, ti) = 0. Next,
both Alice and Bob publicly announce the corresponding
bit strings {yi}i∈Z , {y′i}i∈Z and compute the error rate
Qtest :=
∑
i∈Z yi ⊕ y′i/|Z|. Finally, they compute the
efficiency of Charlie’s operation η := |X |/|X˜ | where
X˜ := {i : (hi = ΓQKD) ∧ (ai = bi = X)}. If Stest < Stol
or Qtol < Qtest or η < ηtol, they abort the protocol.
5. One-way classical post-processing: Alice and Bob
choose a random subset of size mx of X for post-
processing. An error correction protocol that leaks at
most leakEC-bits of information is applied, then an error
verification protocol (e.g., this can be implemented with
two-universal hashing) that leaks dlog2(1/εcor)e-bits of
information is applied. If the error verification fails, they
abort the protocol. Finally, Alice and Bob apply privacy
amplification [32] with two-universal hashing to their bit
strings to extract a secret key of length ` [33].
V. SECURITY DEFINITION
Let us briefly recall the criteria for a generic QKD
protocol to be secure. A QKD protocol either aborts
or provides Alice and Bob with a pair of key strings,
SA and SB , respectively. If we denote by E the infor-
mation that the eavesdropper (Eve) gathers during the
protocol execution, then the joint state of SA and E
can be described by a classical-quantum state, ρSAE =∑
s |s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE where {ρsE}s are quantum systems (con-
ditioned on SA taking values s) held by Eve. The QKD
protocol is called εcor-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ εcor, and
εsec-secret if (1 − pabort) 12‖ρSAE − USA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsec
where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts
and USA is the uniform mixture of all possible values of
the key string SA. Accordingly, we say that the QKD
4protocol is (εcor + εsec)-secure if it is both εcor-correct
and εsec-secret [22, 33, 34]. Note that this security def-
inition guarantees that the QKD protocol is universally
composable [33, 34]. That is, the pair of key strings can
be safely used in any application (e.g., for encrypting
messages) that requires a perfectly secure key (see [33]
for more details).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the following, we present the main result and a
sketch of its proof. For more details about the proof,
we refer to the Appendix.
The correctness of the protocol is guaranteed by the
error verification protocol which is parameterized by the
required correctness εcor.
Main Result. The protocol with parameters (`,mx,
mz,mj , Stol, Qtol, ηtol, leakEC, εcor) is εsec-secret if
` ≤ mx
(
1−log2
(
1+
Sˆtol
4ηtol
√
8− Sˆ2tol+
ζ
ηtol
)
−h(Qˆtol)
)
− leakEC − log2
1
εcorε4
, (1)
for ε = εsec/9 and 2 ≤ Sˆtol ≤ 2
√
2, where h denotes
the binary entropy function, Sˆtol := Stol − ξ and Qˆtol :=
Qtol + µ, with the statistical deviations given by
ξ :=
√
32
mj
ln
1
ε
,
ζ :=
√
2(mx +mjη)(mj + 1)
mxm2j
ln
1
ε
,
µ :=
√
(mx +mz)(mz + 1)
mxm2z
ln
1
ε
.
Proof sketch. Conditioned on passing all the tests in
the parameter estimation step, let XA be the random
variable of length mx that Alice gets from X and let E′
denote Eve’s information about XA at the end of the
error correction and error verification protocols.
We use the following result from [33]. By using privacy
amplification with two-universal hashing, a ∆-secret key
of length ` can be generated from XA with
∆ ≤ 6ε+ 2− 12
(
H3εmin(XA|E′)−`
)
−1
for any ε > 0. Here H3εmin(XA|E′) denotes the smooth
min-entropy [33]. It therefore suffices to bound this en-
tropy in terms of the tolerated values (Stol, Qtol and ηtol).
First, using chain rules for smooth entropies [33], we
get H3εmin(XA|E′) ≥ H3εmin(XA|E)− leakEC− log2(2/εcor),
where E denotes Eve’s information after the parameter
estimation step. Then, from the generalised entropic un-
certainty relation [35], we further get
H3εmin(XA|E) ≥ log2
1
c∗
−Hεmax(ZA|ZB)− log2
2
ε2
,
where c∗ is the effective overlap of Alice’s measurements
(a function of the measurements corresponding to set-
tings Z,X and the marginal state). Here, ZA can be seen
as the bit string Alice would have obtained if she had
chosen setting Z instead. Likewise, ZB represents the bit
string obtained by Bob with setting Z. From Ref. [22],
the smooth max-entropy of the alternative measurement
is bounded by the error rate sampled on the set Z of
size mz, H
ε
max(ZA|ZB) ≤ mxh(Qtol + µ), where µ is the
statistical deviation due to random sampling theory, i.e.,
with high probability, the error rate between ZA and ZB
is smaller than Qtol + µ.
It remains to bound the effective overlap c∗ with Stol
and ηtol. First, we note that X˜ is independent of Char-
lie’s outputs and X ⊆ X˜ with equality only if Charlie
always outputs a pass. Furthermore, X is not neces-
sarily a random subset of X˜ as a malicious Charlie can
control the content of X (this is discussed later). As-
suming the worst case scenario, it can be shown that
c∗ ≤ 1/2 + (c˜∗ − 1/2) /η, where η = |X |/|X˜ | is the effi-
ciency of Charlie’s operation and c˜∗ is the effective over-
lap of X˜ . Next, by establishing a relation between the
effective overlap and the local CHSH test [35] (for com-
pleteness, we provide a more concise proof in Lemma 6
in the Appendix) and using random sampling theory, we
further obtain
c˜∗ ≤ 1
2
(
1 +
(Stol − ξ)
4
√
8− (Stol − ξ)2 + ζ).
Here ξ quantifies the statistical deviation between the
expected CHSH value and the observed CHSH value, and
ζ quantifies the statistical deviation between the effective
overlaps of X˜ and J , respectively.
Putting everything together, we obtain the secret key
length as stated by Eq. (1).
Asymptotic limit. In the following, we consider the se-
cret fraction defined as fsecr := `/mx [3]. In the asymp-
totic limit N → ∞ and using leakEC → h(Qtol) (corre-
sponding to the Shannon limit), it is easy to verify that
the secret fraction reaches
fsecr = 1− log2
(
1 +
Stol
4ηtol
√
8− S2tol
)
− 2h(Qtol). (2)
The expression reveals the roles of the modes of operation
ΓCHSH and ΓQKD. The first provides a bound on the
quality of the devices (which is taken into account by
the log2 term) and the latter, apart from generating the
actual key, is a measure for the quality of the quantum
channel.
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FIG. 2. Secret fraction `/mx as a function of the tol-
erated efficiency of Charlie’s operation ηtol (including
channel losses). We consider a depolarising channel with a
fixed error rate Qtol = 1% and Stol = V 2
√
2. The solid curves
(asymptotic rates, Eq. (2)) are obtained with V = 0.999 and
V = 0.99 from left to right. The right dashed curve (finite-
key analysis, Eq. (1)) is obtained by choosing Stol = 2
√
2,
leakEC = mx1.1h(Qtol + µ), εsec = 10
−8 and εcor = 10−12,
where the classical post-processing block size mx is of the
order of 108 bits.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have proposed a DIQKD protocol which provides
security even if the losses of the channel connecting Al-
ice and Bob would not allow for a detection-loophole free
Bell test. Nevertheless, the security of the protocol still
depends on the losses and the protocol therefore needs
to perform a check to ensure that Charlie does not out-
put a fail too often. This dependence from the failure
probability arises from the fact that a malicious Charlie
may choose to output a pass only when Alice and Bob’s
devices behave badly. Therefore, the CHSH value calcu-
lated from Alice’s CHSH sample is not a reliable estimate
for the overlap of the sample used to generate the key
string. However, with the CHSH test, Alice can estimate
how often her devices behave badly and thus determine
the minimum tolerated efficiency (or the maximum toler-
ated failure probability) of Charlie. This is illustrated in
Fig. 2 where large values of Stol are required to tolerate
small values of ηtol.
Taking the asymptotic limit and the maximal CHSH
value, we see that the secret fraction is independent of
ηtol, which is not so surprising since the maximal CHSH
value implies that the devices of Alice are behaving ide-
ally all the time. Remarkably, we recover the asymptotic
secret fraction for the BB84 protocol [36].
From a practical point of view, the possibility to con-
sider very small values of ηtol is certainly appealing, since
it suggests that the distance between Alice and Bob can
be made very large. A quick calculation using the best
experimental values [37] (i.e., ηtol ≈ t/2 and Stol ≈ 2.81
where t is the channel transmission) shows that the secret
fraction is positive for t > 0.45. This translates to about
a 17km optical fiber between Alice and Bob. Accordingly,
to achieve larger distances, we would need a local CHSH
test that generates violations larger than those achieved
by current experiments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, we provide an alternative approach
towards DIQKD, where the Bell test is not carried out
between Alice and Bob but rather in Alice’s laboratory.
On a conceptual level, our approach departs from the
general belief that the observation of a Bell violation
between Alice and Bob is necessary for DIQKD. On
the practical side, it offers the possibility to replace
the extremely challenging task of implementing a long
distance detection-loophole free Bell test with a less
challenging task, i.e., implementing a local detection-
loophole free Bell test. In fact, recently, there has been
very encouraging progress towards the implementation
of a local detection-loophole free CHSH test [38]. In
view of that, we believe an experimental demonstration
of DIQKD with local Bell tests is plausible in the near
future.
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APPENDIX: Details of security analysis
We present the proof for the main result given in the
main text. First, we discuss about the assumptions and
then introduce the necessary technical lemmas. Second,
we establish a relation between the local CHSH test and
a generalized version of smooth entropic uncertainty re-
lation (Lemma 6). Third, we provide the required statis-
tical statements for estimating certain quantities of the
bit strings of Alice and Bob. Finally, we state our main
result (Theorem 1) which is slightly more general than
the main result presented above.
1. Notations
We assume that all Hilbert spaces denoted by H, are
finite-dimensional. For composite systems, we define the
tensor product of HA and HB as HAB := HA⊗HB . We
denote P(H) as the set of positive semi-definite opera-
tors on H and S(H) as the set of normalised states on H,
i.e., S(H) = {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr(ρ) = 1}. Furthermore, for
a composite state ρAB ∈ S(HAB), the reduced states of
6system A and system B are given by ρA = trB(ρAB) and
ρB = trA(ρAB), respectively. A positive operator val-
ued measure (POVM) is denoted by M := {Mx}x where∑
xMx = 1. For any POVM, we may view it as a pro-
jective measurement by introducing an ancillary system,
thus for any POVM with binary outcomes, we may write
it as an observable O =
∑
x∈{0,1}(−1)xMx, such that∑
x∈{0,1}Mx = 1. We also use x¯ := (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
to represent the concatenations of elements and [n] to
denote {1, 2, . . . , n}. The binary entropy function is de-
noted by h(x) := −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x).
2. Basic assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s abilities
Prior to stating the security proof, it is instructive to
elucidate the basic assumptions necessary for the security
proof. In particular, the assumptions are detailed in the
following:
1. Trusted local sources of randomness. Alice
(also Bob) has access to a trusted source that pro-
duces a random and secure bit value upon each
use. Furthermore, we assume the source is unlim-
ited, that is, Alice can use it as much as she wants,
however the protocol only requires an amount of
randomness linear in the number of quantum states
generated.
2. An authenticated but otherwise insecure
classical channel. Generally, this assumption is
satisfied if Alice and Bob share an initial short se-
cret key [39, 40]. Note that the security analysis of
such authentication schemes was recently extended
to the universally composable framework [33, 34]
in Ref [41], which allows one to compose the error
of the authentication scheme with the errors of the
protocol, giving an overall error on the security.
3. No information leaves the laboratories un-
less the protocol allows it. This assumption is
paramount to any cryptographic protocol. It states
that information generated by the legitimate users
is appropriately controlled. More concretely, we as-
sume the followings
(a) Communication lines.— The only two com-
munication lines leaving the laboratory are the
classical and the quantum channel. Further-
more, the classical channel is controlled, i.e.,
only the information required by the protocol
is sent.
(b) Communication between devices.— There
should be no unauthorized communication be-
tween any devices in the laboratory, in par-
ticular from the measurement devices to the
source device.
4. Trusted classical operations. Classical op-
erations like authentication, error correction, er-
ror verification, privacy amplification, etc must be
trusted, i.e., we know that the operations have ideal
functionality and are independent of the adversary.
5. Measurement and source devices are
causally independent. This means each use
of the device is independent of the previous
uses. For example, for N uses of a source device
and a measurement that produces a bit string
x¯ := (x1, x2, . . . , xn), we have
ρN =
N⊗
i=1
ρi, Mx¯ =
⊗
i
M ixi
where Mx¯ is the POVM element corresponding to
the outcome x¯.
3. Technical lemmas
Lemma 1 (Jordan’s lemma [5, 42]). Let O and O′ be ob-
servables with eigenvalues ±1 on Hilbert space H. Then
there exists a partition of the Hilbert space, H = ⊕iHi,
such that
O =
⊕
i
Oi and O
′ =
⊕
i
O′i
where Hi satisfies dim(Hi) ≤ 2 for all i.
Lemma 2 (Chernoff-Hoeffding [43]). Let X := 1n
∑
iXi
be the average of n independent random variables
X1, X2, . . . , Xn with values in [0, 1], and let µ := E[X] =
1
n
∑
iE[Xi] denote the expected value of X. Then, for
any δ > 0,
Pr [X − µ ≥ δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2n).
Lemma 3 (Serfling [44]). Let {x1, . . . , xn} be a list of
(not necessarily distinct) values in [a, b] with average
µ := 1n
∑
i xi. Let the random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xk
be obtained by sampling k random entries from this list
without replacement. Then, for any δ > 0, the random
variable X := 1k
∑
iXi satisfies
Pr [X − µ ≥ δ] ≤ exp
( −2δ2kn
(n− k + 1)(b− a)
)
.
Corollary 4. Let X := {x1, . . . , xn} be a list of (not nec-
essarily distinct) values in [0, 1] with the average µX :=
1
n
∑
i=1 xi. Let T of size k be a random subset of T with
the average µT := 1t
∑
i∈T xi. Then for any ε > 0, the
set K = X \ T with average µK = 1n−t
∑
i∈K xi satisfies
Pr
[
µK − µT ≥
√
n(t+ 1)
2(n− t)t2 ln
1
ε
]
≤ ε
7Proof. Since T is a random sample of X , from Lemma 3,
we have
Pr [µK − µX ≥ δ] ≤ exp
(−2δ2(n− t)n
(t+ 1)
)
= ε.
Using µX = tnµT +
n−t
n µK we finish the proof.
The main ingredient is a fine-grained entropic uncer-
tainty relation (see [45, Corollary 7.3] and [35]).
Lemma 5. Let ε > 0, ε¯ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ S≤(HABC). More-
over let M = {Mx}, N = {Nz} be POVMs on HA, and
K = {Pk} a projective measurement on HA that com-
mutes with both M and N. Then the post-measurement
states ρXB =
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ trAC(
√
MxρABC
√
Mx), ρZC =∑
z |z〉〈z| ⊗ trAB(
√
NzρABC
√
Nz) satisfy
H2ε+ε¯min (X|B)ρ +Hεmax(Z|C)ρ
≥ log2
1
c∗(ρA,M,N)
− log2
2
ε¯2
, (1)
where the effective overlap is defined as
c∗(ρA,M,N)
:= min
K
{∑
k
tr(Pkρ) max
x
‖Pk
∑
z
NzMxNz‖∞
}
(2)
Note that (1) is a statement about the entropies of
the post-measurement states ρXB and ρZC , thus it also
holds for any measurements that lead to the same post-
measurement states. Accordingly, one may also consider
the projective purifications M′ and N′ of M and N, ap-
plied to ρA⊗ |φ〉〈φ|, where |φ〉 is a pure state of an ancil-
lary system. Since both measurement setups {ρ,M,N}
and {ρA⊗|φ〉〈φ|,M′,N′} give the same post-measurement
states, the R.H.S of (1) holds for both c∗(ρA,M,N) and
c∗(ρA ⊗ |φ〉〈φ|,M′,N′). We can thus restrict our consid-
erations to projective measurements.
In the protocol considered, Alice performs independent
binary measurements — Mi = {M ix}x∈{0,1} and Ni =
{N iz}z∈{0,1} — on each subsystem i. We can reduce (2)
to operations on each subsystem, if we choose K = {Pk¯}
to also be in product form, i.e., Pk¯ =
⊗
i P
i
ki
, where k¯ is
a string of (not necessarily binary) letters ki ∈ K. Then
plugging this, Mx¯ =
⊗
iM
i
xi and Nz¯ =
⊗
iN
i
zi in the
norm from (2), we get
‖Pk¯
∑
z¯
Nz¯Mx¯Nz¯‖∞
= ‖
∑
z1,z2,...
⊗
i
PkiN
i
ziM
i
xiN
i
zi‖∞
=
∏
i
‖Pki
∑
zi
N iziM
i
xiN
i
zi‖∞. (3)
Putting this in (2) with ρ =
⊗
i ρ
i, pik := tr(P
i
kρ
i), and
dropping the subscript i when possible, we obtain,
c∗(ρA,M,N) ≤
∑
k1,k2,...
∏
i
piki maxx
‖Pki
∑
z
N izM
i
xN
i
z‖∞
=
∏
i
∑
k
pik max
x
‖P ik
∑
z
N izM
i
xN
i
z‖∞ =:
∏
i
c∗,i.
(4)
In the following we will refer to
cik := max
x
‖P ik
∑
z
N izM
i
xN
i
z‖∞ (5)
as the overlap of the measurements {M ix}x and {N iz}z.
4. An upper bound on the effective overlap with
the CHSH value
In this section, we first introduce the notion of CHSH
operator [46] and then prove the relation between the
CHSH test and the effective overlap (5).
In the CHSH test, two space-like separated systems
share a bipartite state ρ and each system has two mea-
surements. More specifically, system A has POVMs
{M00 ,M01 } and {M10 ,M11 } and system T has POVMs
{T 00 , T 01 } and {T 10 , T 11 }. Since for any POVM there is a
(unitary and) projective measurement on a larger Hilbert
space that has the same statistics, we can restrict our con-
siderations to projective measurements. Then, we may
write the POVMs as observables with ±1 outcomes, i.e.,
at the site of the first system, the two observables are
O0A :=
∑1
s=0(−1)sM0s and O1A :=
∑1
s=0(−1)sM1s . Fur-
thermore, the measurements are chosen uniformly at ran-
dom. As such, the CHSH value is given by S(ρ, β) :=
Tr(ρβ) where the CHSH operator is defined as
β(O0A, O
1
A, O
0
T , O
1
T ) :=
∑
u,v
(−1)u∧vOuA ⊗OvT (6)
where u, v and s, t are the inputs and outputs, respec-
tively. The maximization of S(ρ, β) over the set of den-
sity operators for a fixed β is defined by Smax(β). More-
over, the CHSH operator can be decomposed into a di-
rect sum of two-qubits subspaces via Lemma 1. Math-
ematically, we may write O0A =
∑
k PkO
0
APk and O
1
A =∑
k PkO
1
APk where {Pk}k is a set of projectors such that
dim(Pk) = 2 ∀ k. Note that in Lemma 1, one may select
a partition of the Hilbert space such that each block par-
tition has dimension two. This allows one to decompose
the general CHSH operator into direct sums of qubits
CHSH operators. Likewise, for the measurements of Bob,
O0B =
∑
r QrO
0
TQr and O
1
B =
∑
r QrO
1
TQr. For all k,
PkO
0
APk and PkO
1
APk can be written in terms of Pauli
operators,
PkO
0
APk = ~mk · Γk and PkO1TPk = ~nk · Γk, (7)
8where ~mk and ~nk are unit vectors in R3k and Γk is the
Pauli vector. Combining (6) and (7) yields
β =
⊕
k,r
βk,r where βk,r ∈ C2k ⊗ C2r (8)
and it can be verified that
S(ρ, β) =
∑
k,r
λk,rSk,r (9)
where
λk,r := Tr(Pk ⊗Qrρ) (10)
Sk,r := Tr(ρk,rβk,r) (11)
Whenever the context is clear, we write S = S(ρ, β) and
Smax = Smax(β).
In the following analysis, we consider only one
subsystem, the superscript i is omitted, i.e., we use
c∗ =
∑
k pkck instead.
Lemma 6. Let {OxA}x∈{0,1} and {OyT }y∈{0,1} be observ-
ables with eigenvalues ±1 on HA and HT respectively
and let β =
∑
x,y(−1)x∧yOxA ⊗ OyT be the CHSH opera-
tor. Then for any ρ ∈ S(HAT ), the effective overlap c∗
is related to the CHSH value S = Tr(ρβ) by
c∗ ≤ 1
2
+
S
8
√
8− S2 (12)
Proof. Using (7), let the relative angle between ~mk and
~nk be θk ∈ [0, pi/2] for all k, i.e., ~mk · ~nk = cos(θk).
Furthermore, we can express ~mk · Γk and ~nk · Γk in
terms of rank-1 projectors. Formally, we have ~mk · Γk =
|~mk〉〈~mk| − |−~mk〉〈−~mk| and similarly for ~nk · Γk. Plug-
ging these into (5),
ck = max
i,j∈{0,1}
|〈(−1)i ~mk|(−1)j~nk〉|2 = 1 + cos θk
2
(13)
Next, we want to relate ck to the CHSH value. Using the
result of Seevinck and Uffink [47], for all r, (11) satisfies
Sk,r ≤ 2
√
1 + sin(θk) sin(θr) (14)
where sin(θk) and sin(θr) quantify the commutativity of
Alice’s kth and system T’s rth measurements, respec-
tively. From (13) and (14) we obtain for all r,
ck ≤ 1
2
+
Sk,r
8
√
8− S2k,r,
where we use the fact that the right hand side is a mono-
tonic decreasing function. Finally, we get
c∗ =
∑
k
pkck =
∑
k,r
λk,rck ≤ 1
2
+
S
8
√
8− S2,
and the inequality is given by the Jensen’s inequality and
(9).
5. Statistics and efficiency of Charlie’s operation
We recall in the protocol description, after the sifting
step, Alice and Bob identify sets X ,Z and J . Also, they
have X˜ where |X˜ | corresponds to the total number of
times Alice chooses sub-protocol ΓQKD, and both Alice
and Bob choose setting X.
Part of the goal is to estimate the average overlap of set
X with the observed CHSH values (evaluated on sets J )
and the efficiency of Charlie’s operation η. Note that η =
|X |/|Xˆ |. To do that, we need the following two lemmas:
the first (Lemma 7) gives a bound on the average effective
overlap of X in terms of the average effective overlap of
X˜ and the efficiency of Charlie’s operation η, and the
second (Lemma 8) gives a bound on the probability that
the observed CHSH value is larger than the expected
CHSH value.
Lemma 7. Let c∗X and c
∗
X˜ be the average effective over-
laps of X and X˜ , respectively, and let η := |X |/|X˜ |. Then
c∗X ≤
1
2
+
1
η
(
c∗X˜ −
1
2
)
Proof. First, we note that X ⊆ X˜ with equality only if
Charlie always outputs a pass (or has perfect efficiency).
Next, we consider {c∗,i}i∈X˜ in decreasing order, that is,
c∗,1 ≥ c∗,2 ≥ · · · ≥ c∗,|X˜ |. Accordingly, the average over-
lap of X˜ can be written as
c∗X˜ =
|X |
|X˜ |
|X |∑
i=1
c∗,i
|X | +
|X˜ |∑
j=|X |+1
c∗,i
|X˜ | ≥
|X |
|X˜ |
(
c∗X −
1
2
)
+
1
2
where we consider that X collects the large effective over-
laps, and the inequality is given by c∗,i ≥ 1/2. Finally,
let η = |X |/|X˜ |.
Lemma 8. Let SJ be the average CHSH value on mj
independent systems, and Stest the observed CHSH on
these systems. Then
Pr
[
Stest − SJ ≥
√
32
mj
ln
1
ε
]
≤ ε.
Proof. We define the random variable
Yi :=
{
1 if si ⊕ ti = ui ∧ ui,
0 otherwise,
where ui, vi, si, ti are the inputs and outputs, respectively
of the measurements on system i, and YJ := 1mj
∑
i∈J Yi.
It is easy to see that Si = 8E[Yi] − 4, SJ = 8E[YJ ] −
4 and Stest = YJ . The proof is then immediate from
Lemma 2.
96. Secrecy analysis
With the relevant results in hand, we are ready to
prove our main result which roughly follows the same
line of argument as Ref. [22]. The main differences are
the use of a more general smooth entropic uncertainty re-
lation (Lemma 5) to bound the error on the secrecy, and
the CHSH test to bound the effective overlap of the mea-
surement operators and states used by the uncertainty
relation (Lemma 6). Since the players can only sample
the CHSH violation, we use Lemma 7 to bound the dis-
tance between this estimate and the expected effective
overlap of the key set. The correctness of the protocol
are evaluated in exactly the same way as in Ref [22], so
we refer to that work for the corresponding bounds and
theorems. We only prove the secrecy of the protocol here.
Contrary to most QKD protocols, the protocol adopts
a tripartite model where Charlie is supposed to estab-
lish entanglement between Alice and Bob. Thus in our
picture, we can view Charlie as an accomplice of the ad-
versary and evaluate the secrecy on the overall state con-
ditioned on the events where Charlie outputs a pass.
We briefly recall the main parameters of the protocol,
which are detailed in the protocol definition given in the
paper. Conditioned on the successful operation of Charlie
(the events whereby Charlie outputs a pass), Alice and
Bob generate systems until at least mx of them have been
measured by both of them in the basis X, mz have been
measured in the basis Z, and j have been chosen for both
CHSH tests. The tolerated error rate and the CHSH
value are Qtol and Stol, respectively.
Furthermore, we take that our information reconcili-
ation scheme leaks at most leakEC + dlog(1/εcor)e-bits
of information, where an error correction scheme which
leaks at most leakEC-bits of information is applied [33],
then an error verification scheme using two-universal
hashing which leaks dlog(1/εcor)e-bits of information is
applied. If the error verification fails, they abort the pro-
tocol.
Theorem 1. The protocol is εsec-secret if for some
εQ, εUCR, εPA, εc∗ , εCHSH > 0 such that 4εQ + 2εUCR +
εPA + εc∗ + εCHSH ≤ εsec, the final secret key length `
satisfies
` ≤ mx
(
1−log2
(
1+
Sˆtol
4ηtol
√
8− Sˆ2tol+ζ(εc∗)
)
−h(Qˆtol)
)
− leakEC − log2
1
ε2UCRε
2
PAεcor
, (15)
where Sˆtol := Stol − ξ(εCHSH) and Qˆtol := Qtol + µ(εQ)
with the statistical deviations given by
ξ(εCHSH) :=
√
32
mj
ln
1
εCHSH
,
ζ(εc∗) :=
√
2(mx +mjη)(mj + 1)
mxm2j
ln
1
εc∗
,
and
µ(εQ) :=
√
(mx +mz)(mz + 1)
mxm2z
ln
1
εQ
.
Proof. Let Ω be the event that Qtest ≤ Qtol and Stest ≥
Stol and η ≥ ηtol. If Ω fails to occur, then the protocol
aborts, and the secrecy error is trivially zero. Condi-
tioned on passing these tests, let X be the random vari-
able on strings of length mx that Alice gets from the set
X , and let E denote the adversary’s information obtained
by eavesdropping on the quantum channel. After listen-
ing to the error correction and hash value, Eve has a new
system E′. Using dlog(1/εcor)e ≤ log2(2/εcor) (the num-
ber bits used for error correction and error verification)
and using chain rules for smooth entropies [33] we bound
the min-entropy of the X given E′
H2ε+εUCRmin (X|E′) ≥ H2ε+εUCRmin (X|E)− leakEC− log2
2
εcor
.
From the entropic uncertainty relation (Lemma 5), we
further get
H2ε+εUCRmin (X|E) ≥ log2
1
c∗
−Hεmax(Z|B)− log2
2
ε2UCR
,
where Z can be seen as the outcome Alice would have
gotten if she had measured the same systems in the cor-
responding basis Z, and B is Bob’s system in this case
(before measurement).
The max-entropy of the alternative measurement is
then bounded by the error rate sampled on the mz sys-
tems Z [22]:
Hεmax(Z|B) ≤ mxh(Qtol + µ(εQ)),
where ε = εQ/
√
pΩ and pΩ := Pr[Ω].
Next, we bound c∗ (evaluated on Alice’s devices from
X ) in terms of the observed CHSH value Stest. We
first use the arithmetic-geometric mean’s inequality, from
which we get
c∗ ≤
∏
i∈X
c∗,i ≤
(∑
i∈X
c∗,i
mx
)mx
= (c∗X )
mx ,
where c∗X is the average effective overlap on X . Using
Lemma. 7, we get
c∗X ≤
1
2
+
1
η
(
c∗X˜ −
1
2
)
.
Since X˜ is randomly chosen by Alice and is independent
of Charlie, c∗X˜ can be estimated from c
∗
J , i.e., we apply
Corollary 4 to further obtain Pr[c∗X˜ − c∗J ≥ ζ(εc∗)/2] ≤
εc∗ , hence
ε′ := Pr
[
c∗X˜ − c∗J ≥
ζ(εc∗)
2
∣∣∣∣Ω] ≤ εc∗pΩ .
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Lemma 6 can now be used together with Jensen’s in-
equality, so with probability at least 1− ε′,
c∗X˜ ≤
1
2
(
1 +
SJ
4
√
8− S2J + ζ(εc∗)
)
.
We still need to take into account that we only have an
approximation for the CHSH value of the systems in J .
From Lemma 8 we get that
ε′′ := Pr
[
SJ ≤ Sˆtest
∣∣∣Ω] ≤ εCHSH
pΩ
.
Finally, the bound on the error of privacy amplification
by universal hashing [33] says that the error is less than
4ε+ 2εUCR + εPA as long as
` ≤ H2ε+εUCRmin (X|E′)− 2 log2
1
2εPA
.
Putting all the above equations together we get (15),
with a total error conditioned on the event Ω of at most
4ε+2εUCR+εPA+ε
′+ε′′. If we remove this conditioning,
the error is then
pΩ(4ε+ 2εUCR + εPA + ε
′ + ε′′)
≤ 4εQ + 2εUCR + εPA + εc∗ + εCHSH ≤ εsec.
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